

AUGUST 2026




INSTITUTE FOR
GOVERNANCE & CIVICS
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IGC POLL REPORT

Public Attitudes Toward Western Civilization

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Western civilization shaped many of the political institutions, civic ideals, and intellectual traditions of the United States. Today, however, many Americans disagree about its role and importance. To establish the first national baseline on how Americans view Western civilization itself, the Institute for Governance and Civics at Florida State University surveyed a nationally representative sample of 1,067 U.S. adults in July 2026. The survey measured attitudes about Western civilization. The findings show:

- **Americans value Western civilization, but many express no clear view.**

Sixty-seven percent say they value Western civilization's achievements, compared with 4% who do not. Fifty percent feel attached to the broader Western tradition, compared with 9% who do not. Only 17% believe that many core Western traditions and values are not worth preserving. Thirty-six percent believe that Western civilization bears significant responsibility for many of the world's current problems, compared with 25% who disagree.

- **Ideology produces the strongest divisions in attitudes toward Western civilization.**

Sixty-four percent of liberals believe that Western civilization bears significant responsibility for many of the world's current problems, compared with 32% of moderates and 21% of conservatives. Conservatives express greater attachment to the Western tradition and stronger appreciation for its achievements.

- **Americans with strongly anti-Western views judge Western civilization more harshly than they do Islamic civilization.**

In a randomized experiment, 23% believe that Western civilization has done more harm than good in world history, while 44% say that about Islamic civilization. Among respondents with strongly anti-Western views, agreement is far higher for the Western-civilization statement than for the Islamic-civilization statement.

- **Support for requiring students to study influential Western texts is high but closely related to views of the West.**

Sixty-five percent support requiring K-12 and college students to study texts associated with Western civilization. Yet strong support declines sharply as views of the West become less favorable.

INTRODUCTION

Western political and intellectual tradition has shaped the United States. Over centuries of Western history, thinkers and institutions developed individual rights, religious liberty, constitutional government, the rule of law, and many of the texts and cultural forms that continue to structure American life. For much of the nation's history, Americans largely took this inheritance for granted rather than treating it as a subject of debate.

That has changed. "Western civilization" now features prominently in debates over education, history, culture, and national identity. Its defenders view it as an intellectual and political tradition that helped produce free institutions, scientific progress, and enduring achievements in philosophy, literature, and the arts. Its critics associate it with conquest, colonialism, exclusion, and inequality.

Somewhat surprisingly, it has become a contested symbol of what Americans should honor, criticize, teach, and preserve. Despite these contests, nationally representative surveys have not asked Americans directly how they view Western civilization itself. Existing surveys measure attitudes on patriotism, national pride, American exceptionalism, or particular episodes in American history. Those measures cannot tell us whether Americans feel attached to the broader Western tradition, value its achievements, believe its core traditions are worth preserving, or regard its historical influence as more harmful than beneficial.

Using data from the Institute for Governance and Civics' July 2026 survey of 1,067 U.S. adults, this report establishes the first national baseline on these questions. We asked respondents to agree or disagree with five statements. These statements measure (1) criticism of Western civilization's historical legacy and (2) global influence, (3) willingness to preserve its traditions and values, (4) personal attachment to the broader Western tradition, and (5) appreciation of its achievements. We combine the five items into an index of respondents' broader orientation toward the West and examine how these views vary across ideological and demographic groups.

We also examine whether these attitudes go beyond general expressions of approval or criticism. The survey included a randomized experiment that tested whether Americans responded differently to the same statement about historical harm when it refers to Western rather than Islamic civilization. We also measure how views of the West relate to support for requiring K-12 and college students to study influential texts associated with the Western tradition.

While more Americans hold favorable views of Western civilization than unfavorable ones, many Americans decline to take a clear position either way. Ideology produces the strongest divisions in responses. Respondents' broader orientation toward the West also relates strongly to their comparative judgments of Western and Islamic civilization and their views on education.

The analyses that follow offer the first systematic portrait of how Americans view the Western tradition that shaped the nation's political institutions and civic culture.

AMERICANS GENERALLY VALUE WESTERN CIVILIZATION, BUT MANY EXPRESS NO CLEAR VIEW

Figure 1 shows that Americans generally express more positive than critical views of Western civilization, though many stop short of taking a clear position.¹




Figure 1. Public Attitudes Toward Western Civilization

Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,060–1,066 across items). Bars show the distribution of responses for each item.

Thirty-six percent agree that Western civilization bears significant responsibility for many of the world's current problems, compared with 25% who disagree. The largest group, 39%, neither agrees nor disagrees.

Just 17% agree that many core Western traditions and values are not worth preserving, while 49% disagree and 34% express no clear view. Similarly, 23% say the world would be better off if Western societies had less influence over global affairs, compared

¹ Results among Florida residents broadly mirror the national pattern, but with a modest pro-West tilt (Appendix Figure A1). Florida residents are somewhat less likely to criticize Western civilization's historical influence and somewhat more likely to value its achievements. Most item-level differences range from 3 to 6 percentage points. On the five-point index ranging from strongly anti-West (1) to strongly pro-West (5), Florida residents average 3.52, compared with 3.43 among non-Florida residents. The difference remains statistically significant after accounting for political and demographic characteristics, though it is substantively modest.

with 35% who disagree. Here again, the largest share, 43%, neither agrees nor disagrees.

Respondents express their most positive views when asked about their personal attachment to Western civilization and appreciation of its achievements. Fifty percent say they feel attached to the broader Western tradition, while just 10% disagree. 41% neither agree nor disagree (i.e., the neutral midpoint of the scale).

An even larger share, 67%, say they value Western civilization's many achievements, compared with just 4% who disagree and 29% who neither agree nor disagree.

To summarize Americans' overall orientation toward Western civilization—and examine how that orientation relates to other attitudes—we average responses across all five items into a single index ranging from strongly anti-West (1) to strongly pro-West (5).² Fifty-eight percent of respondents score above the neutral midpoint, placing them on the pro-Western side of the index. Another 23% fall exactly at the neutral midpoint, while 19% score below it, on the anti-Western side.³

ATTITUDES TOWARD WESTERN CIVILIZATION VARY—ESPECIALLY BY IDEOLOGY

Of all the political and demographic characteristics we examined, ideology produces the largest differences in attitudes toward Western civilization. The clearest divides concern its historical legacy and global influence. As Figure 2 shows, 64% of liberals believe that Western civilization bears significant responsibility for many of the world's current problems, compared with 32% of moderates and 21% of conservatives.

Liberals are also more likely than conservatives to agree that many Western traditions and values are not worth preserving (29% vs. 12%) and that the world would be better off if Western societies had less global influence (39% vs. 17%).

Ideology also shapes the intensity of these views. As Appendix Figure A3 shows, liberals express their criticism more strongly, while conservatives reject the critical statements more strongly. Twenty-seven percent of liberals strongly agree that Western civilization bears significant responsibility for current world problems, compared with 5% of conservatives. By contrast, 27% of conservatives strongly disagree, compared with just 2% of liberals.

Personal attachment also varies by ideology. Sixty-six percent of conservatives say they feel attached to Western civilization, compared with 47% of liberals. Moderates report the lowest attachment, at 37%.⁴

2 The five items form a reasonably reliable summary scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .76$), but they capture related rather than identical aspects of attitudes toward Western civilization. The three items measuring criticism of the West correlate more strongly with one another, while personal attachment and appreciation of Western achievements form a closely related pair. We therefore use the index as a broad measure of respondents' overall orientation toward the West while also reporting results for each item separately.

3 See Appendix Figure A2 for the full distribution

4 Moderates stand out for their frequent use of the neutral midpoint. For instance, half or more take no position on Western civilization's responsibility for current world problems (50%), whether the world would be better off with less Western influence (54%), and whether they feel attached to the Western tradition (55%).




Figure 2. Agreement with Statements About Western Civilization, by Ideology

Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,047–1,053 across items, including 283–286 liberals, 395–399 moderates, and 365–369 conservatives). Markers represent the percentage of respondents in each ideological group who selected either “Somewhat agree” or “Strongly agree”.

Ideological differences are less pronounced when respondents are asked whether they value Western civilization’s achievements. Seventy-six percent of conservatives, 71% of liberals, and 57% of moderates agree. Here too, ideology affects the strength of support more than its overall direction: 48% of conservatives strongly agree that they value Western civilization’s achievements, compared to 25% of liberals and 21% of moderates.

The ideological gradient becomes even clearer when we combine the five items into a pro-West index ranging from 1 to 5. As Figure 3 shows, average scores rise steadily from 2.80 among extremely liberal respondents to 4.07 among extremely conservative respondents.

The 1.27-point gap between the ideological endpoints is substantial on a five-point scale. The relationship also remains strong after accounting for party affiliation and basic demographic characteristics.⁵

⁵ In a model adjusting for party affiliation, age, sex, education, household income, and race and ethnicity, predicted scores range from 2.82 among extremely liberal respondents to 3.96 among extremely conservative respondents.




Figure 3. Average Pro-West Index Scores, by Ideology

Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,039). Markers represent average scores on a pro-West index, which averages responses to five statements about Western civilization. Items measuring criticism of the West are reverse-coded so that higher values consistently indicate more favorable views. The index ranges from 1 (strongly anti-West) to 5 (strongly pro-West). Respondents with missing data on ideological self-placement or any of the five index items are excluded (n = 28).

Ideology is not the only source of variation. Figure 4 shows adjusted scores on the pro-West index by age, education, and race and ethnicity. Each estimate accounts for the other characteristics shown in the figure, along with sex, ideology, party affiliation, and household income.

Average scores rise modestly after age 50 and generally increase with education, from 3.13 among respondents without a high school diploma to 3.62 among those with a graduate degree. White respondents also have higher adjusted average scores than Black, Hispanic, and other non-White respondents.

Higher rates of neutral responses contribute to these differences. Younger adults, respondents with less education, and members of certain non-White groups are generally more likely to select the neutral midpoint rather than express a clearly positive or critical view. The strength and consistency of this pattern, however, vary across statements.




Figure 4. Adjusted Pro-West Index Scores, by Age, Education, and Race and Ethnicity

Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,039). Markers represent adjusted average scores on a pro-West index, which averages responses to five statements about Western civilization. Items measuring criticism of the West are reverse-coded so that higher values consistently indicate more favorable views. The index ranges from 1 (strongly anti-West) to 5 (strongly pro-West). Estimates come from a regression model that includes age, education, race and ethnicity, sex, household income, ideology, and party identification. Respondents with missing data on any covariate or index item are excluded (n = 28).

Overall, these results show that ideology is the strongest dividing line in Americans' views of Western civilization. Liberals express more criticism of its historical legacy and global influence, while conservatives report greater attachment and stronger appreciation for its achievements. Age, education, and race and ethnicity also matter even after accounting for political leanings, but these differences are smaller and often reflect whether respondents take a clear position at all.

JUDGMENTS OF WESTERN AND ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION DIFFER SHARPLY BETWEEN PRO- AND ANTI-WESTERN AMERICANS

To examine how Americans' judgments differ depending on the civilization referenced, we randomly assigned respondents to one of two versions of a question. One group evaluated the statement, "Overall, Western civilization has done more harm than good in world history." The other received the identical statement with "Islamic civilization" substituted for "Western civilization."

Figure 5 shows a large difference between the two groups. Replacing “Western” with “Islamic” increased agreement with the claim that Western civilization has done more harm than good by 21 percentage points, and reduced disagreement by 19 points.

Overall, _____ civilization has done more harm than good in world history.




Figure 5. Responses to Historical Harm Claims About Western and Islamic Civilization

Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,065). Respondents were randomly assigned to evaluate the statement, “Overall, [Western/Islamic] civilization has done more harm than good in world history.” Bars show the distribution of responses within each condition. The Western-civilization condition included 571 respondents, and the Islamic-civilization condition included 494 respondents. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

More specifically, 23% agree that Western civilization has done more harm than good, compared with 44% who say the same about Islamic civilization. The pattern reverses for disagreement: 38% reject the statement when it refers to Western civilization, compared with 19% when it refers to Islamic civilization. The share selecting “Neither agree nor disagree” remains virtually unchanged, at 38% in the Western condition and 37% in the Islamic condition. The wording change also affects the intensity of responses. Twenty-two percent strongly agree and 9% strongly disagree when the statement refers to Islamic civilization, compared with 6% and 19%, respectively, when it refers to Western civilization.

This overall pattern, however, reverses as respondents’ views of the West become less favorable.⁶ Figure 6 shows how the estimated probabilities of agreement and disagreement change across the five-point pro-West index.⁷

⁶ The effect of the civilization named also varies by ideology, age, and race and ethnicity. Conservatives, older adults, and White respondents initially show larger differences between the Western- and Islamic-civilization conditions. Accounting for pro-West orientation substantially reduces these subgroup differences. The age interactions are no longer statistically significant, while the ideological differences remain but are considerably smaller. Differences by race and ethnicity are also reduced, though the contrast between Black and White respondents remains statistically significant. See Appendix Figure A4.

⁷ The reversal does not depend on treating the pro-West index as a continuous measure. Analyses using lower, middle, and higher pro-West orientation

Overall, ___ civilization has done more harm than good in world history.




Figure 6. Predicted Agreement with Historical Harm Claims Across Pro-West Index Scores

Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,038). Connected markers represent predicted probabilities of agreement across a five-point pro-West index. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The index is a reverse-coded version of the pro-West index used earlier in the report and ranges from 1 (strongly anti-West) to 5 (strongly pro-West). Estimates come from weighted logistic regression models that adjust for ideology, party identification, age, sex, education, household income, and race and ethnicity. These pre-treatment covariates are included to improve precision and reduce any residual imbalance between the experimental groups. The Western-civilization condition included 554 respondents, and the Islamic-civilization condition included 484 respondents.

Among respondents at the most pro-Western end of the index, with a score of 5, the estimated probability of agreeing that Western civilization has done more harm than good is just 3%, compared with 73% when the statement refers to Islamic civilization. At the most anti-Western end, with a score of 1, the pattern reverses: the estimated probability of agreeing that Western civilization has done more harm than good rises to 84% for Western civilization but falls to 9% for Islamic civilization. Near the midpoint, respondents evaluate the two civilizations much more similarly.

The disagreement results tell the same story. Respondents with the most pro-Western views overwhelmingly reject the claim when it refers to Western civilization, at 96%, while fewer than 1% of those with the most anti-Western views do so. Disagreement with the Islamic-civilization statement changes much less, rising from 14% to 27% across the index.

groups produce the same general pattern (Appendix Figure A5). The relationship also holds separately for favorability toward Western civilization's historical legacy and influence and for attachment to the Western tradition. Both dimensions remain significant when examined together (Appendix Table A1).

Collectively, these results show that Americans' judgments of the net impact of Western and Islamic civilization correlate strongly with their broader orientation toward the West. Americans overall—and those with pro-West views especially—are more likely to say that Islamic civilization has done more harm than good than to say the same about Western civilization. By contrast, respondents with strongly anti-Western views show the opposite pattern and judge Western civilization much more harshly.

ATTITUDES TOWARD WESTERN CIVILIZATION EXTEND TO EDUCATION POLICY

The preceding findings raise a broader question: Do attitudes toward Western civilization extend beyond general civilizational judgments and relate to other politically and socially consequential views? Subsequent reports will examine how these attitudes relate to antisemitic double standards, endorsement of antisemitic tropes, support for political violence, and civic knowledge. In this report, however, we focus on a policy question directly connected to the Western tradition: whether schools should require students to study influential texts associated with Western civilization.

Figure 7 shows broad support for such requirements at both the K-12 and college levels.




Figure 7. Support for Requiring K-12 and College Students to Study Influential Western Texts

Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,063–1,064 across items). Bars show the distribution of responses for each item.

Sixty-five percent of respondents support requiring K-12 students to study key texts of Western civilization, including 39% who strongly support the requirement. Support is nearly identical for college students, at 65%, including 41% who strongly support it. Only 5% oppose the requirement at either level, while 30% neither support nor oppose it.⁸

⁸ Florida residents show a modestly higher level of support than non-Florida residents (Appendix Figure A6). Seventy percent of Floridians support the K-12 requirement, compared with 64% of non-Floridians, while 69% support the college requirement, compared with 66% of non-Floridians. On the combined five-point measure, Florida residents average 4.09, compared with 3.98 among non-Florida residents. The difference remains statistically significant after adjusting for political and demographic characteristics, but becomes smaller and falls just short of conventional significance after also accounting for pro-West orientation.

Support also extends across ideological groups. For K-12 students, 73% of liberals and 71% of conservatives support the requirement, compared with 54% of moderates. The pattern is similar for colleges, where support reaches 70% among liberals, 71% among conservatives, and 58% among moderates. The main differences concern intensity and neutrality. Conservatives are somewhat more likely than liberals to strongly support the requirements, while moderates are much more likely to select the neutral midpoint.

This broad support, however, varies considerably with respondents' underlying views of Western civilization. Figure 8 shows the estimated probabilities of strong support, somewhat support, neutrality, and opposition across the five-point pro-West index. Estimates adjust for ideology, party affiliation, age, sex, education, household income, and race and ethnicity.

For each of the following education levels, to what extent do you support or oppose requiring students to study influential texts associated with Western civilization, such as Shakespeare, The Iliad and the Odyssey, and writings by the Founding Fathers?




Figure 8. Predicted Support for Requiring Students to Study Influential Western Texts Across Pro-West Index Scores

Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,035–1,036 across models). Connected markers show predicted probabilities across the five-point pro-West index from weighted ordered logistic regression models. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The index ranges from 1 (strongly anti-West) to 5 (strongly pro-West). Because relatively few respondents selected either opposition category, “Somewhat oppose” and “Strongly oppose” are combined into a single “Oppose” category. Models adjust for ideology, party identification, age, sex, education, household income, and race and ethnicity.

Among respondents at the most anti-Western end of the index, just 5% strongly support requiring K-12 students to study these texts, and 7% strongly support the college requirement. Strong support then rises steadily as pro-West orientation increases, reaching 73% for K-12 students and 74% for college students at the most pro-Western end.

The pattern is not simply a shift from opposition to support. Neutrality also decreases sharply across the index. At the most anti-Western end, an estimated 51% neither support nor oppose the K-12 requirement, while 55% take the same position on the

college requirement. Opposition is also relatively common at this end of the index, at 33% and 27%, respectively, but remains less common than neutrality.

In sum, support for requiring students to study influential Western texts extends well beyond conservatives and remains broad across ideological groups. At the same time, it is closely associated with respondents' broader views of Western civilization. As those views become more critical, strong support falls sharply, but neutrality becomes more common than outright opposition.

CONCLUSION

More Americans view Western civilization favorably than unfavorably. Most Americans value its achievements, half express attachment to the broader Western tradition, and relatively few say its core traditions and values are not worth preserving. Yet large shares express no clear view in either direction—and younger adults and respondents with less education are especially likely to select the neutral midpoint on at least some measures.

Ideology produces the strongest divide. Liberals express stronger criticism of Western civilization's historical legacy and global influence, while conservatives report stronger attachment to the Western tradition and greater appreciation for its achievements. Even so, majorities across ideological groups value those achievements and support requiring K-12 and college students to study influential texts associated with the Western tradition. Conservatives generally express that support most strongly.

These attitudes also extend beyond general civilizational judgments. Respondents' broader orientation toward the West is strongly associated with how they evaluate the historical impact of Western and Islamic civilization and with whether they support requiring students to study influential Western texts. Views of Western civilization are therefore not merely symbolic. They relate to comparative historical judgments and contemporary debates over education.

This matters because many American civic ideals and the resulting political institutions emerged from the broader Western tradition. Yet Americans in an increasingly diverse society do not all share the same historical, cultural, or ancestral relationship to that tradition.

The challenge is to sustain an understanding of the Western tradition as a shared civic inheritance rather than the exclusive possession of any ancestry or cultural background. Civic and political traditions do not transmit themselves automatically—they must be taught and learned. Yet our findings show support for requiring students to study influential Western texts on which those civic traditions are based becomes substantially weaker as views of Western culture become less favorable.

If public indifference or negativity toward the Western culture grows in the years and decades ahead, schools and public institutions may devote less attention to it. Americans could consequently become increasingly detached from the civic ideas, texts, and historical debates that shaped the country's founding and political principles.



The long-term question is what kind of civic culture can endure when citizens know less about the intellectual tradition from which their political system emerged. Familiarity with and appreciation for that tradition does not require reverence or the suppression of criticism. But a society that fails to teach it adequately may also lose some of its capacity to understand, defend, and thoughtfully reform the institutions it inherited.

POLL INFORMATION

This study was conducted online between July 8–15, 2026 by Ipsos using KnowledgePanel®, a probability-based online panel recruited through address-based sampling. The full general-population sample consisted of 1,067 U.S. adults age 18 or older, while the separate sample of Florida residents consisted of 424 adults. Results were weighted to represent the national and Florida adult populations, respectively, across demographic, geographic, political, and voting characteristics. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is ± 3.1 percentage points at the 95% confidence level, inclusive of the design effect. Weighted demographic characteristics of the survey sample are presented in Table 1 on the next page.



Table 1. Descriptive Characteristics by Survey Sample

Category	Main Survey Sample	Florida Sample
Sex		
Male	49%	48%
Female	51%	52%
Age		
18 to 29	19%	17%
30 to 49	36%	30%
50 to 64	22%	27%
65 or older	23%	27%
Race/Ethnicity		
Non-Hispanic White	59%	52%
Black	11%	13%
Hispanic	18%	28%
Other	11%	7%
Income		
Less than \$50,000	23%	24%
\$50,000-\$74,999	14%	16%
\$75,000-\$149,999	33%	35%
\$150,000 and over	29%	26%
Education		
Less than HS	10%	10%
HS Graduate	27%	27%
Some college	28%	29%
BA Degree	21%	23%
Postgrad / Prof. Degree	15%	11%
Parent Status		
K-12 Parent	20%	18%
Not a K-12 Parent	80%	82%
Stated Party		
Democrat	28%	23%
Republican	31%	35%
Independent / Something else	41%	42%
Political Ideology		
Liberal	25%	20%
Moderate	38%	39%
Conservative	37%	41%
N	1,067	424



APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES




Figure A1. Attitudes Toward Western Civilization Among Florida Residents

Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the Florida adult population (N = 421–423 across items). Bars show the distribution of responses for each item.




Figure A2. Distribution of Pro-West Index Scores

Note: Histograms show the distribution of scores on the pro-West index, which averages responses to five statements about Western civilization. Items measuring criticism of the West are reverse-coded so that higher values consistently indicate more favorable views. The index (N=1,052) ranges from 1 (strongly anti-West) to 5 (strongly pro-West). Respondents with missing data on any of the five index items are excluded (n = 15).




Figure A3. Attitudes Toward Western Civilization, by Ideology

Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,047–1,053 across items, including 283–286 liberals, 395–399 moderates, and 365–369 conservatives). Bars show the distribution of responses for each item across ideological groups.



Overall, [Western/Islamic] civilization has
done more harm than good in world history.




Figure A4. Adjusted Difference Between the Islamic- and Western-Civilization Conditions, by Ideology, Age, and Race and Ethnicity

Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,038 across models). Markers show the adjusted difference in average agreement between respondents assigned to the Islamic-civilization condition and those assigned to the Western-civilization condition within each subgroup. Positive values indicate greater agreement that Islamic civilization, rather than Western civilization, has done more harm than good; negative values indicate greater agreement that Western civilization, rather than Islamic civilization, has done more harm than good. The baseline adjusted models include party affiliation and demographic characteristics. The second set of models adds the pro-West index and its interaction with experimental condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Separate regression models are estimated for ideology, age, and race and ethnicity.



Overall, ____ civilization has done more harm than good in world history.




Figure A5. Predicted Agreement and Disagreement with Historical Harm Claims, by Pro-West Orientation Group

Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population ($N = 1,038$). Markers represent predicted probabilities of agreement and disagreement within lower, middle, and higher pro-West orientation groups. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The groups were created using tertile cutpoints on the pro-West index, a reverse-coded version of the pro-West index used earlier in the report, with higher values indicating less favorable views of Western civilization. Because of tied index values at the cutpoints, the groups are unequal in size: lower, $n = 198$; middle, $n = 409$; higher, $n = 431$. Estimates come from weighted logistic regression models that adjust for ideology, party identification, age, sex, education, household income, and race and ethnicity. These pre-treatment covariates are included to improve precision and reduce any residual imbalance between the experimental groups. The Western-civilization condition included 554 respondents, and the Islamic-civilization condition included 484 respondents.




Figure A6. Support for Requiring K-12 and College Students to Study Influential Western Texts Among Florida Residents

Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 420–423 across items). Bars show the distribution of responses for each item.



Predictor	Outcome Variable: "Overall, [Western/Islamic] civilization has done more harm than good in world history" (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree)			
Islamic-civilization condition	-4.11*** (0.317)	-2.54*** (0.262)	-3.23*** (0.339)	-4.25*** (0.341)
Overall pro-West index	-1.02*** (0.065)	—	—	—
Historical legacy	—	-0.786*** (0.056)	---	-0.650*** (0.059)
Attachment	—	—	-0.610*** (0.063)	-0.350*** (0.061)
Islamic-civilization condition × Overall pro-West index	1.40*** (0.093)	—	—	—
Islamic-civilization condition × Historical legacy	—	1.01*** (0.082)	—	0.753*** (0.090)
Islamic-civilization condition × Attachment	—	—	1.04*** (0.091)	0.670*** (0.098)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,038	1,038	1,038	1,038
Adjusted R ²	0.317	0.280	0.219	0.322

Table A1. Dimensions of Pro-West Orientation and Judgments of Western and Islamic Civilization

Note: Entries are unstandardized linear regression coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable ranges from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating greater agreement that the civilization named in the experimental statement has done more harm than good in world history. The experimental condition is coded 0 for Western civilization and 1 for Islamic civilization. Higher scores on the overall pro-West index, historical-legacy favorability measure, and attachment measure indicate more favorable views of Western civilization. All models control for ideology, party identification, age, sex, education, household income, and race and ethnicity. Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population.

$p < .05$, $p < .01$, $p < .001$.