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
**INSTITUTE FOR  
GOVERNANCE & CIVICS**  
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

## **IGC POLL REPORT**

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# ***When do Americans Say Political Violence is Acceptable?***

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

When do Americans believe political violence is acceptable? To answer that question, the Institute for Governance and Civics at Florida State University surveyed a nationally representative sample of 1,067 U.S. adults in July 2026. We asked three main questions: (1) whether violence is ever acceptable, (2) whether it is justified after years of failed efforts to achieve change, and (3) whether it is justified when people think the political system is deeply unjust. Key findings include:

- **Most Americans reject political violence, but many do not rule it out.**

Only 55% reject violence on all three questions.

- **Young adults are more open to political violence than older adults.**

Only 40% of adults ages 18 to 29 reject violence on all three questions, compared to 68% of adults 65 and older.

- **Younger liberals are more open to political violence than younger conservatives.**

Among adults under 50, each liberal group is more accepting of political violence than the corresponding conservative group. Extremely liberal young adults show the greatest acceptance. These ideological differences largely disappear among adults ages 50 and older.

- **Americans with favorable views of Western civilization are more likely to reject political violence.**

Among Americans with the least favorable views of Western civilization, only 33% reject violence after years of failed efforts to achieve change. Just 27% reject it when people feel the political system is deeply unjust. Among those with the most favorable views, the corresponding shares are 88% and 87%.

# INTRODUCTION

Is political violence ever acceptable? Do people's answers to this question change when they are told that people have tried for years to achieve political or social change without success? What if they believe a political system is deeply unjust?

To answer these questions, the Institute for Governance and Civics at Florida State University surveyed a nationally representative sample of 1,067 U.S. adults in July 2026. We first asked respondents whether they think violence is ever an acceptable way to achieve political or social goals. We then asked whether they think political violence is acceptable after years of unsuccessful efforts to achieve change or when people believe a political system is deeply unjust.

The difference between these questions matters. American political thought recognizes a right to resist tyranny under exceptional circumstances. It also cautions against overturning an established government for ordinary political grievances.<sup>1</sup>

Our findings show that for each question, most Americans reject political violence, but only 55% reject it on all three questions. Young adults are more open to political violence than older adults. Among adults under 50, each liberal group is more accepting of political violence than the corresponding conservative group, with extremely liberal adults expressing the greatest acceptance. These ideological differences largely disappear among adults ages 50 and older. Finally, Americans with more favorable views of Western civilization are much more likely to reject violence.


## MOST AMERICANS REJECT POLITICAL VIOLENCE ON EACH QUESTION—BUT ONLY 55% DO SO ACROSS ALL THREE

Most Americans oppose political violence on each of the three questions, while relatively few say violence can be acceptable or justified.<sup>2</sup> As Figure 1 shows, 70% agree that violence is never an acceptable way to achieve political or social goals, including 52% who strongly agree. Twelve percent disagree, while 15% neither agree nor disagree, and 3% are unsure.

Americans respond similarly to the two conditional questions. Seventy percent disagree and 9% agree that people may justifiably use violence after years of unsuccessful efforts to achieve political or social change. Sixty-seven percent disagree and 11% agree that people may use violence when they feel a political system is deeply unjust.

1 The Declaration of Independence recognizes a right to alter or abolish a government that becomes destructive of fundamental rights. It also cautions that established governments should not be changed for "light and transient causes," distinguishing such grievances from a "long train of abuses and usurpations" directed toward despotism. See The Declaration of Independence (1776), <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript>.

2 Florida residents expressed nearly identical views (Appendix Figure A1). Sixty-nine percent agreed that violence is never an acceptable way to achieve political or social goals, 71% disagreed that violence becomes justified after years of unsuccessful efforts to achieve change, and 68% disagreed that violence is acceptable when people feel the political system is deeply unjust. The corresponding national estimates were 70%, 70%, and 67%, respectively. None of the response distributions differed significantly between Florida and non-Florida respondents (all omnibus p-values > .82). The Florida oversample included 424 adults.



**Figure 1. Public Attitudes Toward Political Violence**

*Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,063–1,064 across items). Bars show the distribution of responses for each statement. Agreement indicates opposition to violence in the first item but acceptance of violence in the other two.*

Many Americans, however, do not express a clear position on political violence. When asked if violence is ever acceptable, 18% remain neutral or unsure, while 22% to 23% are neutral or unsure on each of the two conditional questions. These respondents do not say violence is acceptable, but neither do they rule it out.

Responses across all three questions provide a fuller picture of how firmly Americans reject violence. Fifty-five percent of Americans reject violence on all three. Another 24% do not say violence is acceptable but they remain neutral or unsure at least once. The remaining 21% say violence is acceptable on at least one question. Only 2% say violence is acceptable on all three.


Taken together, these results show that public opposition to political violence is broad but not always deep.

## YOUNGER AMERICANS ARE MORE LIKELY TO SAY POLITICAL VIOLENCE CAN BE ACCEPTABLE

On every question, opposition to violence rises steadily with age (Figure 2). The left panel shows that 82% of adults ages 65 and older agree that violence is never acceptable, compared to 57% of adults ages 18 to 29. Much of this gap comes from younger adults' uncertainty about whether political violence is permissible. Twenty-eight percent of adults under 30 select "Neither agree nor disagree" or "Not sure," compared to just 10% of those 65 and older. Younger adults are also nearly twice as likely to disagree with the statement that political violence is never acceptable (14% vs. 8%).

The age gaps are even larger on the second and third questions. Eighty-four percent of adults ages 65 and older disagree that people are justified in using violence after years of unsuccessful efforts to achieve change (middle panel). Fifty-four percent of adults under 30 answered the same. When asked whether it is acceptable for people to use violence to change a political system they believe is deeply unjust (right panel), 81% of the oldest adults disagree, compared to 52% of adults under 30. On both of

these second and third questions, 14% to 15% of adults under 30 agree that violence can be justified or acceptable, compared to 5% to 6% of those 65 and older.



**Figure 2. Attitudes Toward Political Violence, by Age Group**

*Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,063–1,064 across items). Markers show the percentage within each age group who agree, disagree, or select “Neither agree nor disagree” or “Not sure.” The figure combines the latter two categories because only 40–54 respondents selected “Not sure” across items, making separate estimates across four age groups imprecise. Although both categories indicate that respondents did not agree or disagree, they may reflect different underlying attitudes; Figure 1 reports them separately. Agreement indicates opposition to violence in the first panel but acceptance of violence in the second and third panels. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.*

Looking at answers to all three questions makes plain the age divide. Only 40% of adults under 30 reject violence on every question, compared to 68% of those 65 and older. Twenty-six percent of younger adults say violence is acceptable on at least one question, compared to 16% of the oldest adults.


These age differences remain after accounting for political ideology, party affiliation, sex, race and ethnicity, education, household income, and census region (Appendix Figure A2).

To be sure, because the survey captures respondents at one point in time, it cannot tell us whether people become more opposed to political violence as they age or whether different generations developed different attitudes. But the results clearly show that younger adults today oppose political violence less than older adults.

## EXTREMELY LIBERAL AMERICANS ARE MOST LIKELY TO SAY POLITICAL VIOLENCE CAN BE ACCEPTABLE

Overall, Americans who identify as liberal are more likely than conservatives to say political violence can be acceptable. Across the three questions, 13% to 17% of liberals say violence can be acceptable or justified, compared to 7% to 11% of conservatives. The percentages who oppose violence tell the same story: 63% to 67% among liberals, compared to 71% to 77% among conservatives.

Digging in to the ideological labels uncovers important differences. We asked respondents to identify on a seven category ideology scale, ranging from extremely liberal (EL) to extremely conservative (EC). As Figure 3 shows, extremely liberal respondents are the least likely to reject violence and the most likely to accept violence—a pattern that remains even when accounting for party affiliation and demographic differences (Appendix Figure A3).



**Figure 3. Attitudes Toward Political Violence, by Ideological Self-Identification**

*Note:* Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population ( $N = 1,050$ – $1,051$  across items). Markers show the unadjusted percentage within each ideological category who agree, disagree, or select either “Neither agree nor disagree” or “Not sure.” For clarity, the figure combines “Neither agree nor disagree” and “Not sure”; relatively few respondents selected “Not sure,” making separate estimates across seven ideological categories imprecise. Agreement indicates opposition to violence in the first panel but acceptance of violence in the second and third panels. EL = extremely liberal; L = liberal; SL = slightly liberal; M = moderate; SC = slightly conservative; C = conservative; EC = extremely conservative. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

The contrast appears most clearly on the first question (left panel). Only 48% of extremely liberal respondents agree that violence is never acceptable. Among everyone else, agreement ranges from 66% to 78%. Looking at their disagreement with the

statement that violence is never acceptable reveals similar results. Twenty-nine percent of extremely liberal respondents disagree, compared to 9% to 16% among everyone else.

Responses to the second and third questions show a similar pattern. Twenty-three percent of extremely liberal respondents agree that people are justified in using violence after years of unsuccessful efforts to achieve change (middle panel). Only 47% disagree. Among all other groups, agreement with this statement ranges from 2% to 15% and disagreement from 67% to 81%.

Twenty-seven percent of extremely liberal respondents agree (51% disagree) that it is acceptable to use violence to change a political system they feel is deeply unjust (right panel). Among the other groups, agreement ranges from 7% to 16%, while disagreement ranges from 62% to 76%.

Extreme conservatives show a similar, though more modest, pattern. On all three questions, extremely conservative respondents reject political violence at lower rates than their conservative and slightly conservative counterparts. None of these differences are statistically significant, however.<sup>3</sup>

## IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES ARE CONCENTRATED IN YOUNGER AMERICANS

Ideological differences in attitudes toward violence are much larger among younger than older adults. To illustrate this, we combine responses to the three questions into a single five-point score. Figure 4 compares scores for adults under 50 and those ages 50 and older after accounting for party affiliation and demographic differences. Higher scores mean greater acceptance of political violence.


Among adults under 50, all three liberal groups score significantly higher than the corresponding conservative groups. Scores are 3.0 versus 2.3 among extremely liberal and extremely conservative respondents, 2.4 versus 2.0 among liberals and conservatives, and 2.2 versus 1.7 among slightly liberal and slightly conservative respondents. But among adults ages 50 and older, these ideological differences largely disappear. Scores range from approximately 1.6 among conservatives to 1.9 among extremely liberal respondents. None of the three comparisons between corresponding liberal and conservative groups reaches statistical significance.

Age differences also appear within nearly every ideological group. In six of the seven groups, adults ages 50 and older score significantly lower than adults under 50, meaning they are less accepting of political violence on average.

The only exception is slightly conservative respondents, who score 1.7 among adults under 50 and 1.8 among those ages 50 and older. The age gap is largest among extremely liberal respondents: 3.0 among adults under 50 and 1.9 among those ages 50 and older, a difference of approximately 1.1 points.<sup>4</sup>

3 On the first question, 66% of extremely conservative respondents reject violence, compared to 72% of slightly conservative respondents ( $p = .360$ ) and 78% of conservatives ( $p = .054$ ). On the first conditional question, the corresponding figures are 73%, 81% ( $p = .197$ ), and 76% ( $p = .551$ ). On the second conditional question, they are 62%, 76% ( $p = .052$ ), and 73% ( $p = .084$ ). Each p-value here tests the difference from extremely conservative respondents.

4 For perspective, this 1.1-point difference amounts to approximately 1.2 standard deviations based on variation in the full analytic sample.



**Figure 4. Acceptance of Political Violence, by Ideology and Age Group**

*Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,049). The figure shows predicted mean scores after accounting for party affiliation, sex, race and ethnicity, education, household income, and census region. The index averages responses to the three political-violence items and ranges from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating greater acceptance of violence. The absolute item was reverse-coded so that all three items run in the same direction. "Not sure" responses were assigned to the scale midpoint alongside "Neither agree nor disagree."<sup>5</sup> Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.*

## PRO-WEST ATTITUDES ARE LINKED TO STRONGER REJECTION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE


Our earlier report, *Public Attitudes Toward Western Civilization*, examined how Americans view Western civilization. It also raised a broader question: Are views of the West related to other important political and social attitudes, including views about political violence?

Using the same five-item Pro-West Index developed for that report, Figure 5 shows how attitudes toward political violence vary across the index's five-point range. The estimates account for ideology, party affiliation, and demographic characteristics. The index combines three statements critical of Western civilization with two statements measuring attachment to its broader

<sup>5</sup> As a sensitivity check, we reconstructed the index after treating "Not sure" responses as missing rather than assigning them to the midpoint. This reduced the analytic sample from 1,049 to 994 but left the adjusted estimates and substantive conclusions nearly unchanged. The overall ideology-by-age interaction remained statistically significant ( $p = .002$ ), and adults ages 50 and older continued to score significantly lower in the same six of seven ideological categories. Slightly conservative respondents remained the sole exception.



tradition and appreciation of its achievements.<sup>6</sup> We score all five so that higher values indicate more favorable views of Western civilization.



**Figure 5. Attitudes Toward Political Violence, by Pro-West Index Score**

*Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,035–1,036 across items). Markers show predicted probabilities at each value of the Pro-West Index after accounting for ideology, party affiliation, age, sex, race and ethnicity, education, household income, and census region. The index ranges from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating more favorable views of Western civilization. For clarity, “Neither agree nor disagree” and “Not sure” are combined. Models treating “Not sure” as a separate outcome produced virtually identical estimated probabilities. Agreement indicates opposition to violence in the first panel but acceptance of violence in the second and third panels. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.*

On the first question (left panel), the share of respondents who agree that “violence is never acceptable” rises from 52% at the lowest point on the Pro-West Index to 77% at the highest. This 25-point increase comes primarily from a 34-point decline in neutral and unsure responses, from 41% to 7%. The share disagreeing also rises, from 7% to 15%, but this difference does not reach statistical significance.

The differences are even larger on the second and third questions. The share who disagree that people are justified in using violence after years of unsuccessful efforts to achieve political or social change rises from 33% at the lowest point on the Pro-West Index to 88% at the highest. On the question about changing a political system that people feel is deeply unjust, disagreement rises from 27% to 87%. On both of these questions, agreement also declines significantly: from 15% to 4% on the

<sup>6</sup> The Pro-West Index averages responses to five statements. Three ask whether Western civilization bears significant responsibility for current world problems, whether many of its core traditions and values are not worth preserving, and whether the world would be better off with less Western influence. Two ask whether respondents feel attached to the Western tradition and value its achievements. We code all items from 1 to 5 so that higher scores indicate more favorable views and then average them. See *Public Attitudes toward Western Civilization* for a fuller analysis of the measure.



first and from 21% to 5% on the second. The largest changes again involve neutral and unsure responses. Their combined share falls from approximately 52% to 8% on both questions.<sup>7</sup>

Views of Western civilization also substantially overlap with ideology. When we compare liberals and conservatives who hold similar views of Western civilization, the differences in their attitudes toward violence become much smaller, especially on the second and third questions.<sup>8</sup> Ideology still matters, as extremely liberal respondents continue to differ from several groups closer to the political center. But the results suggest that ideological differences over political violence are closely connected to broader disagreements about Western civilization.

## CONCLUSION

Americans broadly reject political violence, whether asked about it in general or in specific situations. But that opposition is not as consistent as any single survey question might suggest. Fifty-five percent oppose political violence across all three questions, while only 2% say it is acceptable on all three. The remaining respondents split almost evenly between those who never say violence is acceptable but express neutrality or uncertainty at least once (24%) and those who say it is acceptable at least once (21%). The principal concern, then, is not that large numbers of Americans embrace political violence in all circumstances. It is that many leave open the possibility that *violence could become acceptable* under certain conditions.

That distinction matters because debates over political violence often turn on exceptional circumstances. Accepting violence in one specific situation does not mean someone support political violence in general. It may reflect a belief that violence can become legitimate under extreme conditions. Our questions, however, did not establish that an injustice actually existed or that peaceful avenues for change had been exhausted. They asked whether violence becomes acceptable when *some people* have been unable to achieve change for years or *feel* that the political system is deeply unjust.

Most Americans still reject violence even under these conditions. Yet many remain neutral or unsure, which suggests that opposition to violence is not equally firm across the public. We should not treat neutral or unsure respondents as supporters of violence. At the same time, their reluctance to reject it is troubling.

7 The five questions that make up the Pro-West Index do not relate to attitudes toward violence in the same way. Three measure criticism of Western civilization, while two measure detachment from its tradition and achievements. When both dimensions are included in the same models, criticism predicts greater acceptance of violence on both the full 3-item violence-acceptance index ( $b = .176$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and the two-item conditional-acceptance index ( $b = .244$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Detachment does not predict either outcome ( $b = .039$ ,  $p = .234$ ; and  $b = .031$ ,  $p = .430$ , respectively). The relationships with criticism are significantly stronger in both models ( $p = .015$  and  $p = .002$ ). Item-level analyses show the same distinction on both conditional questions (joint  $p = .011$  and  $p < .001$ ). On the general question of whether violence is ever acceptable, attachment and appreciation appear more closely related to respondents' answers than criticism does, but the difference between the two dimensions is not statistically significant (joint  $p = .473$ ).

8 Adding the Pro-West Index to models that already account for party affiliation and demographic characteristics reduces the liberal-conservative gap on the full violence-acceptance index by 41% among liberals and conservatives, 25% among slightly liberal and slightly conservative respondents, and 47% among extremely liberal and extremely conservative respondents. The corresponding reductions on the two-item conditional-violence index are 50%, 32%, and 55%. None of these matched liberal-conservative contrasts remains statistically significant after including the Pro-West Index (all  $p > .07$ ). Because these data are cross-sectional, this attenuation indicates statistical overlap and does not establish that attitudes toward Western civilization cause or mediate ideological differences in violence attitudes.

Our findings also indicate that Americans of different ages draw different boundaries. Younger adults express both greater acceptance of violence and much less consistent opposition than older adults to it. Whether this difference reflects a stage of life or a lasting generational divide remains unclear. If it reflects lasting generational change, we risk a future in which Americans are less committed to pursuing political change through peaceful means.

The age divide also matters for how we interpret ideological differences in the acceptance of political violence. Overall, Americans who identify as liberal—and especially those who identify as extremely liberal—express greater acceptance of violence than their conservative counterparts. These differences, however, largely disappear among older Americans. This pattern echoes our earlier report on speech, harm, and violence, which also found that ideological differences in acceptance of violence were concentrated among younger adults and largely absent among the oldest adults.<sup>9</sup> The divide is therefore not simply between left and right. Even within the same ideological group, older and younger Americans differ in how acceptable they consider political violence.

Finally, views of Western civilization mark another important divide. Americans with more favorable views of Western civilization are much less likely to consider political violence an acceptable way to achieve political or social change than those with less favorable views.<sup>10</sup>

These findings point to the importance of civics education that honestly teaches both the failures and achievements of the Western tradition. Honest criticism remains essential. But citizens also need to understand what that tradition has produced that is worth preserving: institutions that make criticism, peaceful reform, and the correction of injustice possible. In our constitutional system, major reform depends on persuasion, coalition-building, and winning support across institutions—not on violence. This may make change slower than some people would prefer, but delay does not mean that politics has failed. The goal of civics education is not to teach uncritical pride in the West. It is to help citizens remain committed to peaceful means even when they believe change is too slow and injustice is widespread.

9 See Figure 6 in Goldberg, Z., Owens, R., & Woodworth, L. (2025, November). Americans' troubling views on speech, harm, and violence. Institute for Governance and Civics, Florida State University. <https://igc.fsu.edu/research-data/americans-troubling-views-speech-harm-and-violence>

10 This does not mean criticism of Western civilization causes greater acceptance of violence or that such criticism is inherently dangerous or wrong. It does suggest, however, that attitudes toward political violence—and the ideological divisions surrounding them—partly reflect broader disagreements about the value and legitimacy of the inherited social and political order.

# POLL INFORMATION


This study was conducted online between July 8–15, 2026 by Ipsos using KnowledgePanel®, a probability-based online panel recruited through address-based sampling. The full general-population sample consisted of 1,067 U.S. adults age 18 or older, while the separate sample of Florida residents consisted of 424 adults. Results were weighted to represent the national and Florida adult populations, respectively, across demographic, geographic, political, and voting characteristics. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is  $\pm 3.1$  percentage points at the 95% confidence level, inclusive of the design effect. Weighted demographic characteristics of the survey sample are presented in Table 1 below.

**Table 1. Descriptive Characteristics by Survey Sample**

| Category                     | Main Survey Sample | Florida Sample |
|------------------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| <b>Sex</b>                   |                    |                |
| Male                         | 49%                | 48%            |
| Female                       | 51%                | 52%            |
| <b>Age</b>                   |                    |                |
| 18 to 29                     | 19%                | 17%            |
| 30 to 49                     | 36%                | 30%            |
| 50 to 64                     | 22%                | 27%            |
| 65 or older                  | 23%                | 27%            |
| <b>Race/Ethnicity</b>        |                    |                |
| Non-Hispanic White           | 59%                | 52%            |
| Black                        | 11%                | 13%            |
| Hispanic                     | 18%                | 28%            |
| Other                        | 11%                | 7%             |
| <b>Income</b>                |                    |                |
| Less than \$50,000           | 23%                | 24%            |
| \$50,000-\$74,999            | 14%                | 16%            |
| \$75,000-\$149,999           | 33%                | 35%            |
| \$150,000 and over           | 29%                | 26%            |
| <b>Education</b>             |                    |                |
| Less than HS                 | 10%                | 10%            |
| HS Graduate                  | 27%                | 27%            |
| Some college                 | 28%                | 29%            |
| BA Degree                    | 21%                | 23%            |
| Postgrad / Prof. Degree      | 15%                | 11%            |
| <b>Parent Status</b>         |                    |                |
| K-12 Parent                  | 20%                | 18%            |
| Not a K-12 Parent            | 80%                | 82%            |
| <b>Stated Party</b>          |                    |                |
| Democrat                     | 28%                | 23%            |
| Republican                   | 31%                | 35%            |
| Independent / Something else | 41%                | 42%            |
| <b>Political Ideology</b>    |                    |                |
| Liberal                      | 25%                | 20%            |
| Moderate                     | 38%                | 39%            |
| Conservative                 | 37%                | 41%            |
| <b>N</b>                     | <b>1,067</b>       | <b>424</b>     |




## APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES




**Figure A1. Public Attitudes Toward Political Violence Among Florida Adults**

*Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the Florida adult population (N = 424 across items). Bars show the distribution of responses for each statement. Agreement indicates opposition to violence in the first item but acceptance of violence in the other two.*



**Figure A2. Covariate-Adjusted Attitudes Toward Political Violence, by Age Group**

*Note: Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population (N = 1,050–1,051 across items). Markers show the adjusted percentage within each age group who agree, disagree, or select “Neither agree nor disagree” or “Not sure.” Estimates adjust for ideology, party affiliation, sex, race and ethnicity, education, household income, and census region. The figure combines the latter two categories because only 40–54 respondents selected “Not sure” across items, making separate estimates across four age groups imprecise. Although both categories indicate that respondents did not agree or disagree, they may reflect different underlying attitudes; Figure 1 reports them separately. Agreement indicates opposition to violence in the first panel but acceptance of violence in the second and third panels. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.*



**Figure A3. Covariate-Adjusted Attitudes Toward Political Violence, by Ideological Self-Identification**

*Note:* Estimates are weighted to represent the U.S. adult population ( $N = 1,050-1,051$  across items). Markers show the adjusted percentage within each ideological category who agree, disagree, or select either “Neither agree nor disagree” or “Not sure.” Estimates adjust for party affiliation, age, sex, race and ethnicity, education, household income, and census region. For clarity, the figure combines “Neither agree nor disagree” and “Not sure”; relatively few respondents selected “Not sure,” making separate estimates across seven ideological categories imprecise. Agreement indicates opposition to violence in the first panel but acceptance of violence in the second and third panels. EL = extremely liberal; L = liberal; SL = slightly liberal; M = moderate; SC = slightly conservative; C = conservative; EC = extremely conservative. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.